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ETHICS IN ENVIRONMENTAL ADR: AN
OVERVIEW OF ISSUES AND SOME
OVERARCHING QUESTIONS
Jennifer Gerarda Brown*
I. INTRODUCTION
I want to begin this examination of ethics in Environmental
Alternative Dispute Resolution ("ADR") by posing a central, and
somewhat confrontationally formulated, question: what is so special
about environmental disputes? What, if anything, should one have to
say about the ethics of Environmental ADR that would not be true of any
other kind of ADR? Do neutrals in environmental cases function
differently from other neutrals, so that ethical quandaries arise requiring
special ethical norms? Do the parties to environmental disputes
categorically operate in a way different from other groups of disputing
parties? Do they have distinct interests at stake that might raise special
ethical problems? And what of the lawyers? Is there something about
advocacy or problem solving in environmental cases that could
fundamentally change lawyers' relationships with clients, opponents,
neutrals, and third parties?
To answer this question, let us back up a bit. About fifteen years
ago, Professor Owen Fiss published his essay, Against Settlement, in
which he attacked the burgeoning field of ADR as being overly
concerned with efficiency - the clearing of court dockets - at the expense
of justice.1 Many scholars and practitioners of ADR since then have
challenged the assertions of Professor Fiss, arguing that ADR can claim
superiority to standard litigation on grounds of quality as well as
quantity. These proponents of ADR have claimed, in other words, that
ADR can resolve more cases in less time and at lower cost than standard
litigation can, but that, even if ADR fails on these efficiency grounds, the
quality of the process and the results that emerge from it will, in the
main, be superior to litigation as well.
. Professor, Quinnipiac College School of Law. Director, Quinnipiac Center on Dispute
Resolution. Senior Research Associate, Yale Law School.
I Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073, 1085-86 (1984) (defining "justice" as
a public judgment rendered according to public norms by a neutral who has in turn been
chosen by the public).
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The empirical claims about ADR's efficiency are as yet unproven.
Nevertheless, Fiss's argument is normative, not empirical. No matter
what the data on case processing might ultimately reveal, Fiss's concern
for the quality of justice retains its salience. In no area do we see this
more than in environmental law, particularly, though not exclusively,
with respect to public disputes. Here, we can give great weight to Fiss's
worries that public values will be lost in the private resolution of
disputes. We can see the sense in his call for the guiding wisdom, not to
mention coercive power, of a publicly chosen neutral, often a judge, and
preferably one who enjoys substantial independence from changing
political winds. It may be that Fiss's essay romanticizes litigation, the
court system, and the justice obtainable therein. However, we cannot so
easily dismiss the argument. Fiss's concerns about public values raise
important questions not just about system administration, but also about
the ethical legitimacy of removing environmental cases from more public
judicial and administrative fora.
The thesis of this Article is that the central ethical problem in
Environmental ADR is the problem of representativeness. 2 This problem
springs from the task of insuring genuine, widespread, representative
public participation. It arises when we try to set tolerable levels of harm
to future generations, challenging us to ask whether anyone here and
now is representing those future souls. It even comes into play when we
ask who can legitimately represent the interests of other species and
natural resources, with questions such as, "should trees have standing?" 3
The public nature of environmental disputes necessarily implicates
interests and values that might not be as salient in other contexts. This
problem of representativeness is a start, at least, to answering the
question I posed above, about what makes Environmental ADR so
special as an ethical matter.
An outsider to environmental law might be tempted to minimize the
aspects of environmental cases that make them unique sites for, ADR.
After all, one might argue that ethical norms remain constant; they can
be applied with only minimal tailoring to different substantive contexts. 4
2 See generally J. Clarence Davies, Environmental ADR and Public Participation, 34 VAL. U. L.
REV. 389 (2000) (outlining some of the practical problems involved in attempting to
represent public views in environmental disputes).
3 See Christopher D. Stone, Should Trees Have Standing?-Toward Legal Rights for Natural
Objects, 45 S. CAL L. REv. 450 (1972).
4 I myself might be inclined to respond to the problem in just this way. I come to the
topic of this symposium as a relative outsider to the field of environmental law. I teach and
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Yet this generalist perspective takes us only so far. As those who
practice in this area know so well, environmental disputes often
implicate interests -- such as the interests of the general public in a clean
and safe environment, for both this and future generations -- that might
not be as prominent in other contexts. Thus, environmental cases offer a
particularly challenging context for reconciling competing ethical claims:
lawyers' duties to their clients versus their sense of pubic responsibility;
mediators' need to remain impartial versus their desire to ensure the
longevity and justice of agreements they facilitate; parties' desire to
maximize their individual, short-term interests versus their sense of
responsibility to absent parties, future generations, other species, and the
beauty of this planet.
This public interest gives rise to ethical issues that are tempting to
ignore, but will actually require serious engagement if the quality of
Environmental ADR is to remain high. Nevertheless, addressing those
ethical issues will not always be easy. Doing so will muddy any clean,
simple formulation of client welfare and attorney responsibility. Often,
addressing the ethical issues will be impossible, unless we are willing to
complicate our taxonomy of dispute resolution and our definitions of
"mediation." If, to borrow the title of this symposium, Environmental
ADR is to "work" in America - that is, if it is to balance all the many
values at stake when we tackle public disputes in relatively private
realms - then we must not shy away from complexity or compromise.
Now, if one thinks broadly enough about the "interests" of the
parties to an environmental dispute, one can always reconcile what is
"best" for an individual disputant with what is best for future
generations or other parties not represented at the table. Mediators
could stick to a traditional, "norm-generating" 5 approach, secure in the
knowledge that the parties have accounted for all relevant interests and
that the agreement they reach adequately serves those interests. With a
sufficiently broad conception of client interests, lawyers could
incorporate the anticipated concerns of third parties or future
generations, balance those against immediate, articulated self-interests of
the particular client, and advocate for third parties and future
write about Alternative Dispute Resolution and Professional Responsibility, so I bring to
the issues I will be addressing the perspective of a generalist; I see the characteristics and
obligations of participants in Environmental ADR as having much in common with
participants in any sort of dispute.
5 See, e.g., Ellen A. Waldman, The Challenge of Certification: How to Ensure Mediator
Competence While Preserving Diversity, 30 U.S.F. L. REV. 723 (1996).
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generations with the belief that such an approach is in the client's best
long-term interests.
But, this is morals on the cheap. It is cheap for the lawyer, mediator,
or analyst of the system generally to water down the firmly-held, deeply-
rooted self interests of the parties to an environmental dispute. A
passionate or, to put it more negatively, selfish party, whether an
individual or an organization, will not so easily accept the proposition
that a mediator can advocate for the interests of the public or future
generations with no deterioration in the appearance of neutrality; nor
will a client blithely sit by while its lawyer advocates for these third
party interests. And yet, I will argue that significant ethical problems
arise if these outside interests are ignored.
This Article will therefore consider what, if any, ethical obligations
fall upon the various participants in Environmental ADR to ensure that
the interests of outsiders are somehow accounted for and expressed. The
primary focus will be on attorneys' professional responsibilities. It will
review some of the norms provided by the American Bar Association to
see whether they offer lawyers sufficient guidance in this area. 6 The goal
will be to piece together some support for the proposition that the rules
foresee situations in which lawyers' absolute loyalty to the client is
qualified by an overarching concern for public welfare. The rules
generally do not go so far that they create room for much lawyer
movement here; if public values are to come into mediation in significant
ways, it will have to be the mediator who imports them. The Article will
conclude by briefly considering the ethics of mediator activism in
environmental cases.
II. LAWYERS' ETHICAL NORMS
In this examination of lawyers' norms, I will use as my basic text the
American Bar Association Rules of Professional Conduct ("Model
Rules"). 7 I select them not because they represent the only, or even the
primary, set of ethical norms governing lawyers' conduct, but because,
as they have been adopted by forty-one states and are under
consideration in a few more, they come closest to representing the
6 For a more thorough treatment of the inadequacies of the ABA Model Rules in the
context of mediation, see Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Ethics in Alternative Dispute Resolution:
New Issues, No Answers from the Adversary Conception of Lawyers' Responsibilities, 38 S. TEX. L.
REv. 407 (1997).
7 MODEL RuLEs OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDucr (1997).
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profession's sense of itself. Even if lawyers' conduct often deviates from
certain provisions in the Model Rules, the rules tell us a great deal about
our aspirations and our view, most centrally, of the attorney-client
relationship.
With respect to that relationship, the ABA generally subscribes to the
view that a lawyer stands with her client "against the world," as an
unquestioned ally in adversarial dealings with outsiders.8 As Professor
Carrie Menkel-Meadow has argued, this view of a lawyer's role does not
mesh well with what we know about ADR and the very important ways
lawyers can facilitate their client's participation in it.9 Nonetheless, until
they undergo substantial revision,10 the rules uphold a view of the
attorney-client relationship based strongly on an adversarial assumption.
Perhaps no set of ethical rules more clearly defines the attorney-
client relationship in this way than those pertaining to confidentiality.
Under those rules, in the absence of client consent, lawyers may not
reveal any information "relating to the representation."" Exceptions to
this rule are few. A lawyer may, however, reveal information in order to
prevent the client from committing a crime likely to result in serious
bodily harm or death, or to allow the lawyer to defend against
allegations of wrongdoing. 12
Some states have extended the exceptions, and these extensions may
reflect some compromise in the absolutist view of the lawyer and client
"against the world." One sort of extension appears in state rules that
present broader circumstances justifying disclosure. In these states,
rather than restricting the justified disclosure to cases in which a client is
about to commit a violent crime, the rules permit disclosure when a
9 I jokingly refer to this as the "Helen Reddy" view of lawyering, in honor of her corny
but memorable song from my early adolescence, You and Me Against the World. HELEN
REDDY, You and Me Against the World, on GREATEST HrIs (AND MORE) (Capital Records
1975).
9 Menkel-Meadow, supra note 6, at 431. Current ethical codes require "zealous conduct
where it may be dysfunctional." Id.
10 As part of the American Bar Association's Ethics 2000 project, some of the Rules of
Professional Conduct may be revised, and new provisions added. See Bruce Lyons, ABA
Section Reports: Criminal Justice: Joining Forces with the DA and Defense, NAT'L L.J., Aug. 9,
1999, at 89 ("In the coming year, the ABA Commission on Evaluation of the Rules of
Professional Conduct (Ethics 2000) will keep revising ABA ethics rules that are used as a
model for state ethics codes.").
11 MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6(a) (1997).
12 MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCr Rule 1.6(b)(1)-(2) (1997).
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client threatens to commit criminal fraud, 3 a non-criminal fraud likely to
injure property, 4 or, in some states, any crime.15 In other states, the
exceptions to confidentiality have been extended by making disclosure
under certain circumstances mandatory rather than discretionary. 16
Florida and New Jersey are two examples of the principle described
earlier in the paragraph. In the Florida rules, for example, a lawyer
"must" disclose confidential information to prevent a client from
committing any crime - whether a violent crime or property crime.17 In
one popular Continuing Legal Education ("CLE") program, 18 the New
Jersey rule is cited in a hypothetical case involving illegal dumping of
industrial waste, suggesting that lawyers' duties of confidentiality might
not protect information related to such environmental harms.
In mediation, to the extent that the process requires a lawyer to be
more forthcoming, to share information or to make concessions, progress
might be impeded by the lawyer's general duty of confidentiality. At
least as the ABA envisions it, that duty of confidentiality seems to arise
from the "you and me against the world" dynamic. Exceptions create a
small crack in that wall, but they are so narrowly drawn that they are
unlikely to arise in the context of an environmental mediation. 9
Though, at one time, commentators and even courts promoted a "public
13 Arizona, Colorado, and Connecticut take this approach. See THOMAS D. MORGAN &
RONALD D. ROTUNDA, 2000 SELECTED STANDARDS ON PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 136-37
(2000).
14 Alaska, Hawaii, and Maryland are examples of this approach. See id. at 135,138, 141.
Is New York, Pennsylvania, and Vermont take this very broad approach. See id. at 144-45,
147.
16 Florida, New Jersey, Virginia, and Wisconsin, for example, all require disclosure to
prevent a crime that will result in serious bodily injury or death. See id. at 137, 143, 148-49.
17 See id. at 137.
18 See CENTER ON PROFESSIONALISM UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA, CONFLICTS AND
CONFIDENTIALITY: TROUBLE AT UPPER BLACK EDDY 22-23 (1991).
19 Some of the comments to Model Rule 1.6 reinforce this view that the duty of
confidentiality is not absolute. According to comment 16, when a lawyer withdraws from
representing a client, the lawyer may withdraw or disaffirm earlier documents the lawyer
prepared or filed on the client's behalf, and may send a notice of withdrawal to other
parties or to a neutral. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6 cnt. 16
(1997). This is referred to as a "noisy" withdrawal and, though it formally preserves the
substantive confidentiality of client information, it nonetheless allows a lawyer to send a
strong signal - one that could be adverse to the client's interests. Id. Again, we see some
compromise of the sacrosanct duty of confidentiality, but only when client misconduct is
leading a lawyer to sever the relationship; withdrawals can be "noisy" but ongoing
representation cannot.
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interest" exception to the duty of confidentiality,20 the current rules
governing lawyers provide no basis for such public spiritedness.
In addition to Model Rule 1.6, other rules protect lawyer/client
confidentiality. The prohibition on a lawyer's communicating with a
person the lawyer knows to be represented in a matter is another way of
safeguarding confidences between lawyer and client; the rule protects
clients from exploitation by other people's lawyers when they are
represented but their lawyers are absent at the time of the
communication.
Model Rule 4.2 exerts an interesting constraint on lawyers' ability to
take a problem-solving approach in some cases. In a forthcoming book
on lawyers as negotiators, Professor Robert Mnookin, Scott Peppet, and
Andrew Tulumello discuss the problems a lawyer faces when she would
like to take a problem-solving approach to negotiation, but her own
client, as well as the lawyer and the client on the other side, all reject
such a problem-solving approach.21 I would argue that the problem is
even more complex than Mnookin and his co-authors acknowledge,
because Model Rule 4.2 makes it difficult to distinguish this
prototypically difficult case from a case in which lawyers and clients are,
in a sense, mismatched. The problem-solving lawyer may not be the
only person at the table who wants to cooperate; the client on the other
side might agree. However, because Model Rule 4.2 allows the lawyer
on the other side to act as a sort of screen between his cooperative client
and our problem-solving heroine, the rule can actually impede
nonadversarial attempts to resolve disputes. 22
In addition to confidentiality rules, the ABA provides several rules
that enforce lawyers' general duty of loyalty to their clients. Model Rule
1.7, the general rule on concurrent conflicts of interest, states that
lawyers are forbidden to "represent a client if the representation of that
2 See STEPHEN GILLERS, REGULATION OF LAWYERS: PROBLEMS OF LAW AND ETHICS 57-59
(5th ed. 1998).
21 ROBERT MNOOKIN, ET AL., BEYOND WINNING: How LAWYERS HELP CLIENTS CREATE
VALUE IN NEGOTIATION (forthcoming 2000) (manuscript at 175, on file with author).
22 See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 4.2 (1997). Granted, this dire
situation is less likely to arise if all lawyers are following the Model Rules; even a
competitive lawyer should, it seems, capitulate to his client's clearly stated views on the
appropriate approach to take in negotiation. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
Rule 1.2 (1997). The trouble is that not all clients will be able or permitted to articulate this
preference clearly.
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client will be directly adverse to another client"23 or "if the
representation of that client may be materially limited by the lawyer's
responsibilities to another client or to a third person, or by the lawyer's
own interests." 24 This prohibition is qualified, however, by the fact that,
if the lawyer reasonably believes the representation will not adversely
affect relationships with each client and each client consents after
consultation, the representation can go forward.25 Of course, in some
cases, disclosing enough information to fully inform one party will
necessarily require divulging another client's ethically protected
information. Getting the client's consent to reveal this information can
be tricky. How can the client know whether to approve disclosure if the
client does not know much about the person or entity who will receive
the information? The problem can become somewhat circular, and the
lawyer may find these curative consents difficult to obtain.
Nevertheless, the ABA provides a good prophylactic in the
comments to Rule 1.7. If a "disinterested lawyer would conclude that
the client should not agree to the representation under the
circumstances, the lawyer involved cannot properly ask for such
agreement or provide representation on the basis of the client's
consent." 26 The circular sort of situation described above could easily be
one in which a disinterested lawyer would conclude that the client
should not give consent. If the situation is so sensitive that the lawyer
fears disclosing even enough information to obtain the parties' informed
consent, that alone might be a sign that the conflict is irreconcilable and
withdrawal from the representation of one or both clients is in order.
In environmental cases, Model Rule 1.7 could arise in a myriad of
ways, but most direct conflicts would be similar to the analysis in tort or
commercial cases. Environmental cases might present uniquely
challenging contexts for the application of Model Rule 1.7's prohibition
of indirect conflicts - those cases in which the lawyer's representation of a
client could be materially limited by the lawyer's own interests or the
interests of third parties. In these cases, obtaining client consent would
be relatively simple, requiring only that the lawyer confess her own
interests or describe the interests of the third party to whom,
presumably, the lawyer owes no duty of confidentiality, and explain to
the client the consequences of going forward with the representation.
23 MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.7(a) (1997).
24 MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.7(b) (1997).
2 MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDUcT Rule 1.7(a), (b) (1997).
26 MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.7 cmt. 5 (1997).
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The most difficult part of the process might be the introspection
necessary for the lawyer to realize that her own interests and values
could compromise her service to the client.
It is not as if the Model Rules fail to recognize that lawyers'
preferences and perspectives will sometimes diverge from those of their
clients. Lawyers are not required to be such unquestioning boosters that
they align with all of their clients' interests. Although Model Rule 1.2
makes clear that "[a] lawyer shall abide by a client's decisions concerning
the objectives of representation," the rule and its comments also permit
lawyers to "limit the objectives of the representation if the client consents
after consultation." 27 In addition, the rule clearly states that "[a] lawyer's
representation of a client.., does not constitute an endorsement of the
client's political, economic, social or moral views or activities." 28 Model
Rule 2.1 also weighs in here, requiring lawyers to "exercise independent
professional judgment and render candid advice," including, at the
lawyer's option, some analysis of the "moral, economic, social and
political factors" relevant to the client's situation.29
While these rules make some room for lawyers to speak for the
interests of the public or third parties when advising their clients, it is
another matter entirely to suggest that the ABA rules would countenance
lawyers' advocacy of such interests in mediation. A vision of lawyers'
professional responsibility that significantly folds in protection of these
outside interests diverges from the profession's view of itself, at least as
that view is reflected in the ABA Rules. Thus, the problem of
27 MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDucr Rule 1.2(a), (c) (1997).
28 MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDUcr Rule 1.2(b) (1997).
29 MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDucT Rule 2.1 (1997). One comment to this rule
states:
A client may expressly or impliedly ask the lawyer for purely technical
advice. When such a request is made by a client experienced in legal
matters, the lawyer may accept it at face value. When such a request is
made by a client inexperienced in legal matters, however, the lawyer's
responsibility as advisor may include indicating that more may be
involved than strictly legal considerations.
Id. at cmt. 3.
As I have stated elsewhere, it has always seemed strange to me that this comment seems to
assume some correlation between legal experience and moral, economic, or social
understanding. In many cases, the relationship between legal knowledge and wisdom in
other areas is an inverse one. It is not at all clear that the lawyer should heed a request for
"purely technical" advice when it comes from a legally sophisticated client, but ignore such
a request when it comes from one less well versed in legal affairs. See Jennifer Gerarda
Brown, Rethinking "The Practice of Law," 41 EMORY L.J. 451, 464, n.58 (1992).
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representativeness in Environmental ADR does not find an easy solution
in lawyers' own norms of self-governance.
H. RECONCILING COMPETING CLAIMS: MACRO AND MICRO
When environmental disputes are to be resolved outside the
standard public fora generally entrusted with adjudication or
administration of claims, then, we can see the double-edged nature of the
change: 1) the privacy available through ADR could free parties to make
concessions to which they might not agree in more public settings, but it
could also serve to screen disputes and negotiated agreements from the
concerned eyes of the public who also have interests at stake, often
related to fundamental health and safety;3 0 2) the informality available
through ADR could give the parties license to conceive their dispute
expansively, bringing in parties and interests that might be excluded by
court standards for joinder, relevancy, and standing, but it could also
deprive interested parties of the procedural safeguards that ordinarily
guarantee them access to information and the opportunity to be fully
heard by decision makers.
Thus, two issues may arise in environmental ADR more pointedly
than they do in other areas. First, who is absent from the table who
ought to be there? Second, once these missing parties are identified, who
among those present can represent them at the table?
A. Macro Competition: Procedural Norms in Mediation vs. The Nature of
Environmental Disputes
Ethical problems in Environmental ADR arise because the
procedural ground rules in mediation can seem inconsistent with the
substantive interests at stake in environmental disputes. If
Environmental ADR is to "work" in the U.S., we must find a way to
reconcile these two sometimes-inconsistent values.
3 See Aseem Mehta, Note, Resolving Environmental Disputes in the Hush-Hush World of
Mediation: A Guideline for Confidentiality, 10 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 521,522 (1997):
In order to promote settlements and thus relieve overcrowded dockets,
courts promote mediation, and mediation receives more
confidentiality protection than traditional settlement negotiations.
Opposing the trend towards greater confidentiality are citizen suit
provisions in the major environmental statutes, 'Sunshine Acts', which
require government actors to open meetings to the public, and the
realization that the settlement of environmental disputes often affects
people who are not represented in the underlying litigation.
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1. Mediation Models and Ground Rules
In its "purest" form, mediation is not an occasion for the neutral to
introduce and advocate for any particular substantive norms. Instead,
the mediator focuses on process and permits the parties to select the
legal and non-legal values bearing on their dispute. As Professor Ellen
Waldman explains, "the leitmotif of the [traditional,] norm-generating
model, then, is its inattention to social norms. In an effort to spur
innovative problem-solving, the model situates party discussion in a
normative tabula rasa. The only relevant norms are those the parties
identify and agree upon." 31
Waldman echoes Lon Fuller, who has asserted that "traditional or
norm-generating mediation 'is commonly directed, not toward achieving
conformity to norms, but toward the creation of the relevant norms
themselves."'3 2 Some mediators go further, introducing substantive
norms to the discussion, explaining their consequences, but not arguing
for or against their appropriateness to the dispute.33 This "norm-
educating" model does not rely upon the parties to supply all of the
standards or rules relevant to the dispute, but it does assume that the
parties can assess the applicability of the norms without significant
mediator input.34
2. The Special Nature of Environmental Disputes
Norm-generating and norm-educating mediation models are not
always appropriate, however, as Waldman explains:
In some contexts.., the norm-educating model is
insufficiently protective of party and societal interests.
This is true when the power imbalance between the
parties is so extreme that one party cannot provide a
trustworthy waiver, when the institutions administering
mediation have a mandate to enforce statutory law,
and/or when the dispute involves public resources or
implicates public values in such a profound way that
their enforcement outweighs the disputants' interests in
3' Ellen A. Waldman, Identifying the Role of Social Norms in Mediation: A Multiple Model
Approach, 48 HASINGS L.J. 703, 718 (1997).
3 Id. at 718-19 (quoting Lon L. Fuller, Mediation - Its Forms and Functions, 44 S. CAL. L. REV.
305,308 (1971)).
3 See, e.g., id. at 730.
3 Id. at 731-32.
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achieving settlement. In these instances, a norm-
advocating model better suits the task at hand. 35
In environmental cases, particularly, mediators do not always find
that the parties are able or willing to generate all of the norms that might
apply to the dispute.
Lawrence Susskind summarizes the situations in which this might
occur and the consequences if the failure of norms goes unaddressed:
If the parties involved in environmental mediation reach
an agreement, but fail to maximize the joint gains
possible, environmental quality and natural resources
will actually be lost. If the key parties involved in an
environmental dispute reach an agreement with which
they are pleased, but fail to take account of all impacts
on those interests not represented directly in the
negotiations, the public health and safety could be
seriously jeopardized. If the key parties to a dispute
reach an agreement, but selfishly ignore the interests of
future generations, short term agreements could set off
environmental time bombs that cannot be defused.36
These serious consequences lead Susskind to conclude that,
compared to other fields in which mediation might occur, environmental
mediation requires the participants to pay "much closer attention to the
interests of those unable to represent themselves... [to] attempt to
understand the complex ecological systems involved and to generate
appropriate compromises that go beyond their self-interests." 37 When
the parties fall short of these goals, he asserts, the mediator must take
responsibility for representing and protecting these outside interests. 38
And what are the interests that may be unrepresented? Some
communities affected by environmental decision-making might be
unaware that a dispute affecting them is under negotiation. Even if
individual members of an affected community know about the
3 Id. at 742.
36 Lawrence Susskind, Environmental Mediation and the Accountability Problem, 6 VT. L. REV.
1,7-8 (1981).
3 Id. at 16.
38 Id. at 18 ("[Einvironmental mediators ought to accept responsibility for ensuring (1) that
the interests of parties not directly involved in negotiations, but with a stake in the
outcome, are adequately represented and protected .... ").
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mediation, collective action problems and scarce financial resources
might prevent the community from mobilizing to become involved in
the negotiations. The nature of the environment as a "public good" can
create disincentives for individual members of the public to absorb costs
in protecting resources that will be available to the public generally. If
the affected interests are plant or animal species that might be threatened
by a proposed activity, those non-human interests may lack a
spokesperson to articulate their position in the negotiation.
Future generations are sometimes strongly affected by proposed
resolutions of environmental disputes; yet, they cannot participate in
current negotiations. Even when the interests of future generations are,
in theory, to be accounted for, the law often carries an inherent bias
against them.39 As Thomas McGarity and Sidney Shapiro explain:
The practice of discounting future benefits to present
value.., biases cost-benefit analysis against future
generations. A high discount rate clearly biases the
analysis against future benefits, even though "it is not
clear why the later-born should have to pay interest to
induce their predecessors not to exhaust [depletable
resources]." 40
An ethic seeking "sustainable development" might better reconcile
the interests of current and future generations.41 But who will advocate
for such a norm?
3 See Richard L. Revesz, Environmental Regulation, Cost-Benefit Analysis, and the Discounting
of Human Lives, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 941 (1999). Although "[miost policy planning
discussions assume full altruism - future citizens are given equal weight with present
citizens - and discount solely for the time value of money," this practice of discounting
"privileges the interests of the current generation to a very large extent." Id. at 997-98.
Revesz illustrates the impact of this discounting practice with some powerful examples. Id.
at 998.
40 Thomas 0. McGarity & Sidney A. Shapiro, OSHA's Critics and Regulatory Reform, 31
WAKE FoREST L. REv. 587,629 (1996).
41 Richard Revesz explains that sustainable development can be equated with
"intergenerational equity," defined by reference to three principles:
First, the principle of conservation of options requires each generation
to preserve the natural and cultural resource bases so that the options
available to future generations are not unduly restricted. Second, the
principle of conservation of quality requires each generation to prevent
a worsening of the planet's environmental quality. Third, the principle
of conservation of access requires each generation to provide its
members with equitable rights of access to the legacy of past
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One might argue that if parties could negotiate before the situation
becomes a "dispute," the ethical tensions might be eased. But interest-
based negotiations are not always simpler to conduct from an ethical
perspective. Consider, for example, the EPA's Excellence in Leadership
Project, popularly known as Project XL. Project XL is designed to "allow
regulatory flexibility in return for superior environmental performance
at selected facilities on a facility-by-facility basis."42 The cornerstone of
the project is negotiation among regulators, facility owners, and the
affected community, resulting in a "Final Project Agreement" (FPA)
governing environmental performance at the facility.43 This agreement
usually relaxes some statutory standard - leading one EPA staffer to
remark, "'if it ain't illegal, it ain't XL.'" 44 The purpose of the negotiation
then is, at least in part, to draw affected parties to the table and get all of
them to sign off on this illegality. The goal is not only to effectively
prevent governmental enforcement action through the EPA or the state,
but also to forestall citizen enforcement actions.
It does not always work out this way, however. The difficulty in
identifying the relevant community can undermine the ability of the
negotiations to prevent subsequent enforcement actions. In a recent law
review article, Charles Caldart and Nicholas Ashford relate the story of
the Intel Corporation's newest semiconductor production site in
Chandler, Arizona. A five-year project agreement covering operations at
a 720-acre site was negotiated among the company, federal and state
regulators, and five Chandler residents. The participants in the
generations, and to conserve this access for the benefit of future
generations.
Revesz, supra note 39, at 1010-11 (paraphrasing EDITH BROWN WEISS, IN FAIRNESS TO
FUTURE GENERATIONS: INTERNATIONAL LAW, COMMON PATRIMONY, AND
INTERGENERATIONAL EQUITY 40-45 (1988), and Edith Brown Weiss, Intergenerational Equity:
A Legal Framework for Global Environmental Change, in ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE AND
INTERNATIONAL LAW: NEW CHALLENGES AND DIMENSIONS 385, 401-05 (Edith Brown Weiss,
ed., 1991)).
42 Charles C. Caldart & Nicholas A. Ashford, Negotiation as a Means of Developing and
Implementing Environmental and Occupational Health and Safety Policy, 23 HARV. ENVTL. L.
REV. 141, 182 (1999).
43 This is different from the kind of negotiation that occurs in the context of the permitting
process, where the negotiations generally focus on the appropriate way to apply current
regulations to the facility in question. Project XL negotiations can replace current
standards with a new, negotiated standard, actually making new environmental policy -
though, as Caldart and Ashford observe, it is policy on a "facility-by-facility basis." Id. at
182 n.219.
44 Id. at 183.
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negotiations were presumably satisfied with the agreement, but there is
reason to believe that they did not represent all of the relevant interests.
For example, the agreement has been vehemently criticized by the
Silicon Valley Toxics Coalition, a California-based group that addresses
pollution problems in the semiconductor industry, as well as the Natural
Resources Defense Council (NRDC), a national environmental group.
The interests of these organizations and their constituents are apparently
broader than those brought to bear in the negotiations; they have
industry-wide or national concerns rather than a focus on local impact.
As Caldart and Ashford point out, the five community representatives
who participated in the negotiations were members of a pre-existing
Intel Community Advisory Panel, generally representative of a
community that values Intel's contribution to the economic life of
Chandler, AZ. This could be quite different from a perspective of those
that "place[] environmental and public health protection... at the
forefront." 45
However, would Intel have consented to participate in negotiations
that included environmental groups such as the Silicon Valley Toxics
Coalition or the NRDC? When these and other environmental groups
asked Intel to augment the agreement with legally enforceable pollution
prevention requirements, Intel was not receptive. In a Washington Post
column, Intel's government affairs manager was quoted as asking,
apparently with some indignation, "Citizens are going to make
decisions... that are binding on Fortune 500 Companies?" 46 The same
sort of skepticism could emerge in mediation.
The problem, of course, is that any attempt by a mediator to bring
the public interest into the discussion could appear to run against one of
the bedrock values of mediation: mediator neutrality. Indeed, Joseph
Stulberg has argued that when Lawrence Susskind merely calls upon
mediators to "be concerned about" the impact of negotiated agreements
on "underrepresented or unrepresentable groups in the community" or
"[tihe long-term or spillover effects" of settlements, Susskind is arguing
that mediators should not be neutral.47
Id. at 184-85.
46 Id. at 185-86 (quoting Cindy Skrzycki, Some State Environmental Chiefs Want EPA Off the
Stage, WASH. PosT, June 20,1997, at G1).
47 Joseph B. Stulberg, The Theory and Practice of Mediation: A Reply to Professor Susskind, 6
VT. L. REv. 85, 86 (1981) (citing Susskind, supra note 36, at 46).
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Stulberg claims that his disagreement with Susskind is more than
just a "terminological quibble," 4 and yet I wonder what is really at stake
in their debate. What turns on this question seems, in some ways, to be
little more than a claim to pedigree: is the accountable neutral Susskind
describes a real mediator, or something else? Perhaps this debate is a
creature of the time in which it occurred. In 1981, mediation was just
starting to expand outside the labor field, and practitioners and theorists
alike were understandably a bit prickly about labels. More than a turf
war, this was a battle for legitimacy; with such a limited performance
record, the reputation of mediation and mediators could be damaged if
lower-quality processes and practitioners, touted as mediation, yielded
bad experiences or dissatisfying results. Eighteen years later, the
Stulberg-Susskind debate blurs when viewed through the lens of ADR's
absolute explosion and enthusiastic reception by courts and disputants
alike. From this vantage point, it is easy to think that Stulberg was being
a bit too persnickety about titles when he declared that "a mediator
publicly committed to a particular substantive outcome with the power
to move the contesting parties toward an agreement" may be an effective
intervenor, but that person assumes "a different kind of intervention
posture from that of a mediator."49
Still, the fact that "public participation" is set forth as an
independent mode of resolving public environmental disputes suggests
that, in some cases at least, such participation will not be possible. This
raises the question: what, if any, responsibility do the parties at the table
have to insure that unrepresented interests are accounted for in their
agreement?
B. Micro: Lawyer and Mediator Ethics in Environmental ADR
The "Accountable" Mediator
When Lawrence Susskind calls upon mediators to be mindful of
interests not represented at the table, to "attempt to understand the
complex ecological systems involved," and to "generate appropriate
compromises that go beyond [the parties'] self-interests," he is sketching
in broad strokes the "accountable mediator" model.5° This accountable
mediator is much more activist - and substantively interventionist - than
mediators in the standard model. Susskind and others have argued that
48 Id. at 87.
49 Id. at 87-88.
50 See Susskind, supra note 36, at 16.
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such accountability is necessary in order to insure that environmental
dispute resolution serves the public interest as well as the interests of the
parties.
According to Donald T. Weckstein, however, mediator activism can
be reconciled with traditional norms in mediation. He argues that "a key
professional role of the mediator is to maximize self-determination based
upon informed consent, exercised within the confines of the societal
purpose of the dispute resolution context." 51 The social purpose of the
dispute resolution context has to include some sense of the substantive
law in the field.5 2 Sensitivity to context is crucial, he observes. Thus:
[p]ursuant to this professional obligation, in certain
circumstances, the mediator's role to assure the
disputant's informed self-determination would ethically
justify a greater degree of activistic intervention.
Among the circumstances favoring enhanced
interventions are: (1) when the parties request their use
or appear to need or expect activist assistance from the
mediator, and (2) when the dispute resolution context
calls for accountability by the mediator to third parties
or overriding legal principles.0
Although Weckstein is writing about mediation in general terms,
environmental mediation could frequently give rise to the second set of
circumstances he describes - where the substantive context creates
relevant third party interests or overriding legal principles. If a mediator
consults with the parties to a dispute and informs them about the
mediator's usual style of mediation, and if the parties choose to go
forward with the mediator upon that understanding, then "the mediator
should be free to offer such interventions as he or she deems
appropriate."%
Perhaps we should go even further and say that the mediator should
not only be free to offer these interventions, but should be compelled to
do so as a matter of good practice. Let me be clear: raising these outside
s1 Donald T. Weckstein, In Praise of Party Empowerment - And of Mediator Activism, 33
WILLAMETrE L. REV. 501, 557 (1997).
Id. Mediators should help disputants resolve, "or choose not to resolve," their
differences "in a manner not inimical to the law or social purpose of the dispute
resolution." Id.
53 Id. at 559.
54 Id.
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interests will often complicate the negotiations and require the parties to
surrender some "gains of trade" not just to the other parties at the table,
but to parties and interests absent from the negotiations as well. We can
expect that incorporating these outside interests will make the mediation
more difficult for everyone involved, and that, if left to their own
devices, disputants as well as neutrals might prefer to neglect them. It
may well be that, in order to prevent a race to the bottom, we must
compel rather than permit mediators to advocate for norms and interests
not otherwise represented.
IV. CONCLUSION
In a fable written by Peter Lovi, a town planner in Ithaca, New York,
various parties involved in the mediation of a public dispute express
concerns to the mediator, explaining why they want to withdraw from
the process. The "ethicist" demands:
We are looking for an outcome which is fair, not only for
the present members, but for those yet to come and
those who have passed on. Who speaks for these
people? Who has the right to judge our actions ethically
legitimate? Answer these questions and we will return
to negotiations.
The mediator replies:
Are you not a man like other men; do you not have joys
and fears, anger and anguish? Do you not laugh and
cry? The decisions we make here are not written in
stone; we are only men, not gods. It is sufficient merely
that we be representative of those who might discuss the
issue. This is why we try to get as many people
involved as possible in our discussions. We will make
errors in our solutions; we should accept our fallibility
graciously but not shirk our responsibilities because of
it.56
Perhaps it is significant that in this fable, the mediator refers to "our
solutions" and decisions that "we" make. The mediator tells the ethicist
H LAWRENCE BACOW & MICHAEL WHEELER, ENVIRONMENTAL DISPUTE RESOLUTION 278
(1984).
%' Id.
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that if "we" are "representative of those who might discuss the issue,"
the mediation will be ethically "sufficient." In this model, the mediator
becomes actively engaged in the mediation, not just as a facilitator of the
parties' solutions, but actually claiming ownership of the solutions
himself.
This Article has pressed a similar thesis: in an effort to ground
environmental mediation in the public interest, both the parties and the
mediator will have to look outside their own roles and interests,
narrowly defined, and attempt, as best they can, to represent the
interests of absent parties. The rules governing lawyers leave little room
for protection of outside interests if that protection diverges from the
interests of the client. This may call for a more activist approach from
the mediator, one that exceeds a purely facilitative approach and
includes some evaluation or norm advocacy. In this way, the mediator
might fill in the gaps if the parties neglect some of their representative
responsibilities. The mediator is more likely than the parties' lawyers to
be able to reconcile this norm advocacy with the ordinary functions that
accompany the role.
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